Squaring the circle? by Karsai, Judit
1 
 
Squaring the Circle? 




The government participates in the venture capital market in many different ways. This paper 
examines the role of the state as an investor and gives a thorough review of international 
trends through examples. It outlines, that contrary to direct participation that could result in 
the distortion of market processes, the government is increasingly contributing to the growth 
of venture capital market funds while including the private sector in the process. The 
inclusion of the private sector is important primarily because this solution ensures the 
selection of projects that are economically viable, promising and free from political influence, 
the selection of financing periods independent from election times, and the adequate expertise 
and incentives of managers entrusted with the investment’s management. The main 
conclusion of the study is that only privately managed venture capital funds financed only to a 
lesser extent by the state allow for the adequate utilization of state resources, and thus they 




Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) code: G23, G24, G28, M13, O31. 
Whereas venture capital is a characteristic of market competition, in many countries the state 
plays a significant role in the capital supply of venture capital markets. There are countries 
where even the birth and strengthening of the venture capital industry was partially assisted 
by the government (EVCA, 2010). During the economic crisis the resulting sharp decline in 
the risk-taking willingness of investors led to the corrective role of the state becoming more 
prevalent in the venture capital market (Brander et al., 2010, Kramer-Eis–Lang, 2011, Private 
Equity Findings, 2010). 
There are a number of arguments for the government’s participation in the venture capital 
market. According to arguments referring to the market failure and a financing gap – by 
ensuring a critical mass of capital – state intervention could indicate the worthiness of seed or 
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early phase investments to private investors (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003). This claims that 
government intervention promotes the creation of a seed and early phase private sector 
segment in the market. Another argument claims that state participation is based on 
considerations that go beyond pure financial gains, namely on social and national strategy 
interests such as job creation and the boosting of the economy of certain regions and sectors 
(Lerner, 2009, Murray et al., 2012). Therefore government participation in the venture capital 
market is underpinned by the fact that through meeting the capital demand of promising, 
young and innovative enterprises a socially desirable outcome is achieved. The government 
can fulfil a useful community task if it is able to identify investment projects that promise 
great social benefit and through adequate incentives it can channel the attention of financial 
intermediaries (private investors) towards such enterprises. 
The success of venture capital investments also depends on the operational environment of 
venture capital markets, i.e. the current state of the economy, the development level of 
financial institutions, the condition of the job market, the amount spent on research and 




Even though the most obvious form of government participation in the venture capital market 
is direct investment, the state also has a regulatory role. Among the many opportunities that 
the government has for participation in the venture capital market this paper examines those 
forms where the state acts as an investor in the supply of funds to the venture capital market. 
Therefore to achieve its objectives the government can create a central fund that boosts 
resources of venture capital funds – it can invite private investors to the funds set up by the 
state or it can reduce the costs and the risk of investing exclusively in private sector funds. 
There are a number of solutions that can make cooperation between public and private 
investors smoother and joint investments more attractive through asymmetric risk bearing or 
uneven share of benefits (Murray, 2007). 
This topic is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, the financial and economic crisis that started in 
2008 affected the European, namely the Central Eastern European countries to a large extent, 
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In order to avoid future crises, changes in the financial regulation aimed at reducing system-related risks 
introduced even stricter restrictions than before in the venture capital industry. The restriction of venture capital 
market investments of institutional investors and the introduction of a new regulation on venture capital 
management companies are some of the changes that affect the activity of venture capital funds. Such changes 




their venture capital industry was more severely impacted than that of their Western 
counterparts, and therefore public support became increasingly more important for them. 
Secondly relevant reason means that the European Union – sensing the problems related to 
traditional venture capital investments – introduced a new scheme available to member states 
that enabled greater public funds to be accessed than before. This is the new JEREMIE 
program that made it possible to use part of the structural funds for venture capital purposes. 
It is already available to the new member states joining from Central-Eastern Europe. 
The train of thought in this article is the following: The analysis first examines the importance 
of the state’s participation in the venture capital market then it presents and categorizes the 
different government schemes applied at a national and international level in order to boost 
funds for the venture capital market. The paper examines the factors that affect efficiency of 
the public venture capital programs, their benefits and disadvantages, and it draws 
conclusions about the state’s participation in the venture capital market. 
The effect of the crisis on government participation in venture capital markets 
Statistical data confirms that during crises the importance of government funds for early stage 
innovative companies increases. A sign of this is that since 2010 European governmental 
agencies have provided more than 30 percent of equity raised by venture capital funds (EVCA 
Yearbook, 2014). Even in 2013 34 percent of equity raised in European venture capital funds 
originated from governmental resources. In 2007 governmental contribution amounted only to 
€650 million, in 2010 and since 2011 it amounted to €1 billion and €1.5 billion respectively, a 
development contrary to the business cycle. Given the fact that between 2007 and 2013 the 
equity volume raised by venture capital funds in the private and public sector jointly dropped 
to a half, this “naturally” led to a greater share of public investors (Kramer-Eis et al., 2014). 
The importance of public funds in the Central Eastern European region is reflected in that 
around half of the €433 million raised in 2013 by venture capital and private equity funds 
headquartered in the region originates from government sources. An even larger share of the 
€88 million equity raised by regional funds in 2013 to finance specifically early phase 
companies – namely over 60 percent – was provided by government institutions, which is 
almost double the 34 percent measured for the whole of Europe. The high proportion of 
public resources in Central Eastern Europe was not only typical of 2013. In the five years 
between 2009 and 2013 near 40 percent of venture capital funds specialized in regional 
investment came from governmental bodies (EVCA, 2014). 
The fact that public equity programmes are widespread is also supported by data published by 
the European Commission. According to this half of the equity and quasi-equity funds 
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invested between 2007 and 2012 in Europe originated from European community – more 
precisely EU structural – funds (European Commission, 2013). 
According to Brander et al. [2010] government funds contributed to venture capital financing 
not only in Europe, but all over the world to a significant extent in terms of the number of 
companies that gained accessed to capital. In their estimate the ratio of venture capital 
financed companies that received public equity exceeded 50 percent in Canada, was around 
35 percent in Germany, and approximately 25% in France and Belgium as well. In the United 
Kingdom more than half of early stage deals were provided by hybrid funds that 
simultaneously used public and private funds (Pierrakis and Mason, 2008). The high ratio of 
government participation is not accidental, since according to an OECD survey conducted in 
2013 there is some sort of public equity program in most member states, and their number has 
been increasing over the last five years (Wilson–Silva, 2013). 
The different types of public venture capital programs 
Defining governmental participation in the venture capital market is by no means obvious. 
Some experts include in the definition all programs where equity is invested in young 
companies or that encourage other equity intermediaries to carry out such investments 
(Lerner, 2002). According to another approach governmental participation covers programs 
that support high-tech industries through venture capital funds and taxation policy (Cumming, 
2007). Yet another branch of governmental participation is hybrid schemes, where venture 
capital funds use both public and private resources (Jaaskelainen et al., 2007). 
In regards to the supply of funds for venture capital markets there are two basic structures for 
government participation. One is the support of private venture capital fundraising whereby 
the government acts as a limited partner and increases the equity of venture capital funds 
managed by otherwise independent fund management companies. Such indirect public 
participation in venture capital markets is represented by the Innovation Investment Fund in 
Austria, the Yozma program in Israel, the SBIC construction in the United States, the High 
Tech Fund of Funds in the United Kingdom, the Vaekstfonde in Denmark, the Fund for the 
Promotion of Venture Capital in France and the ERP-EIF Dachfonds in Germany. 
The other form of direct involvement by the government is the setting up of state-owned 
venture capital funds or exclusively mandated fund management companies to manage state-
owned venture capital funds. In such instances the state applies a so called hands-on 
approach, i.e. it creates a venture capital fund that is owned by a state organization, where the 
state is also General Partner and therefore responsible for the selection of the portfolio 
companies and investment related decision-making after a state-appointed fund manager is 
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entrusted with the task of operating the state sourced capital. For example some such 
constructions are the Biotech Fonds Vlaanderen in Belgium, the SITRA in Finland, DC 
Innovation in France, TBG in Germany, Piemontech in Italy, Axis Participaciones 
Empresariales in Spain and the Scottish Enterprise in the United Kingdom. In Central and 
Eastern Europe the simultaneous participation of the state in the venture capital market as an 
owner and fund manager is particularly widespread, this is how the Hungarian Development 
Bank participates in the financing of the venture capital industry in Hungary. 
In the beginning many governments opted for the latter, more direct route that is they 
established a state-managed venture capital fund. As the setting up of a state fund, when the 
government is a fund manager and an investor at the same time, entails the risk of market 
distortions due to bad placement of capital and the probability to exclude private investors 
(Armour and Cumming, 2006, Avinimelech and Teubal, 2006, Gilson, 2003, Leleux and 
Surlemont, 2003, Lerner, 2009), many of these constructions have since been amended 
(OECD, 2013). 
In the case of indirect state investments the government participates in the process by 
mandating private sector venture capital management companies with the management tasks. 
The state delegates the executive power to the fund manager, while it acts as one of the 
investors of the financed funds, with special objectives. Besides an expected yield such 
objectives could include the development of certain regions, job creation or the promotion of 
innovation. Nowadays this indirect way of government participation in the venture capital 
market is the most dominant one (Gilson, 2003, OECD, 2006). Indirect public investment 
therefore is basically a co-investment structure. The government itself does not create a 
venture capital fund, but with its investment it joins private funds. In such cases the state does 
not only entrust the management of the fund to a private fund manager, but it becomes merely 
one of the co-financing limited partners of the fund.  Besides effecting leverage, this solution 
is also effective in building the market of seed and early-stage investments, through the 
availability of ampler resources and conducive to growing the professionalism of its 
participants. Co-financing could also attract foreign investors provided the regulatory 
environment allows for it. Co-financing can take many different forms. Most often the state 
invests in the funds with conditions identical to what apply to private investors – i.e. pari 
passu. There can be conditions that are more favourable to private sector investors compared 
with their public peers. These are meant to provide incentive and protection for them. Such 
asymmetric financing schemes ensure a higher proportion of the yields than their share of 
investment, and likewise, they carry a ratio of the losses smaller than their share. This bonus 
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provided to private limited partners, intends to compensate the higher risk and slower rate of 
return that accompanies seed and early-stage financing. Experience indicates that these hybrid 
constructions offer the right incentives without resulting in unwanted consequences while 
they have a positive impact on the yield (Murray, 1998). In recent years – in the wake of 
success of the already existing programs – these co-financing funds have become very 
popular. 
Another fairly widespread solution for indirect government investments is the fund of funds 
scheme. Public funds do not directly go to a selected fund, but a state holding fund is 
established from state resources and so private funds can apply for its public equity. The fund 
manager of the government owned holding fund, in the allocation of the public resources, 
only finances funds that undertake to meet certain objectives in their investment policy 
important for the state, such as the financing of young companies with a high growth potential 
(Murray, 2007). 
According to the strength of the market’s role there is a full range of models with different 
levels of state participation in the venture capital market. On one end of this range there are 
investments carried out exclusively by wholly state-owned investment funds, then there are 
individual co-financing schemes with public investment and finally there are hybrid funds co-
financed by private investors and state holding funds. There are also public funds that 
occasionally join individual private sector investments, and there is the financing of private 
venture capital funds that have international financial institutions among their limited 
partners. Besides the share of equity, the differences between these solutions can also be the 
size of the investment effectuated, the hurdle rate, the criteria applied in the selection of 
companies and the incentive methods used to stimulate private limited partners among the 
fund’s investors. 
A survey conducted by the OECD in 2013 (Wilson–Silva, 2013) indicates that 14 out of 32 
member states have direct government capital investment programs, while 21 pout of 21 
countries have fund of funds and co-investor constructions structures. Among co-financing 
programs the so called pari passu types were more prevalent at 80%. Among the programs the 
number of fund of funds and schemes realizing co-investments have increased while direct 
investment programs decreased in number. In case of co-investment structures the general 
practice is to conduct a preliminary screening of the investors that wish to join, an acceptable 
practice in almost 75 percent of the cases. 
International public equity programs 
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Besides public equity programs at the national level international government equity 
investment programs also play an important role in the development of the venture capital 
market. In Europe for example public contribution to venture capital funds from EU resources 
is a widely used tool of enterprise and innovation policy (EC, 2006a, 2006b, Martin et al., 
2003, Murray, 1998). Moreover, with the lack of private and informal investments, 
international structures are one of the most important and continuous sources providing new 
companies with venture capital on the European market. 
There are many different EU resources to support venture capital financing. Member states 
can spend resources from the EU structural funds on venture capital programs, but the 
development of the venture capital industry can be supported with European Investment Bank 
(EIB) and European Investment Fund (EIF) resources; these resources can even be linked.  
Unfortunately it is difficult to give a picture based on data summarized and published by the 
European Union on the amount dedicated to finance venture capital in a given programming 
period, and what percentage of it was actually used, i.e. allocated to the different members 
states and the amounts they provided for the beneficiary funds and they in turn to the financed 
enterprises. The main challenge is that funds dedicated to the same objective in the different 
programs are not added up. For example, measures that support the financing of small and 
medium-size enterprises are separate from the ones that promote innovation, whereas 
supporting venture capital can occur in both. 
The European Union’s €3.6 billion European Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme – CIP) dedicated to financing innovative small and medium-size enterprises 
between 2007 and 2013 covers numerous aims. It included – among others – the improvement 
of competitiveness, support of innovation and entrepreneurship, promotion of technology 
transfer, assistance of the appearance of new financial intermediaries, the role of being a 
catalyst towards market-oriented investors, the spread of renewable energy and the support of 
energy efficiency. 60 percent of the program budget constituted one of its main pillars: the 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme (EIP). From the EU budget the EIP program 
enabled credit, guarantee and the provision of venture capital through the financial 
engineering instruments by envisioning over €1 billion in equity. Slightly over the half of this 
amount was designated to boost venture capital equity that undertakes to finance fast-growing 
innovative small and medium-size companies. The regulation prescribes that at least fifty 
percent of privately-managed venture capital fund financing must come from private investors 
and the state – as an investor to the funds itself – would contribute with similar conditions. 
Besides these programs, European venture capital funds could receive government support 
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even from other EU resources such as the JEREMIE–program through the European 
Regional Development Funds (ERDF). 
In the framework of the Joint European Resources for Micro and Medium Enterprises – 
JEREMIE program announced in 2005 participants had to invest their EU funds until the end 
of 2015. The financial package created with the contribution of the European Commission, 
the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund offers old and new EU 
members an opportunity to invest a part of the structural funds as refundable amounts into 
venture capital. Venture capital constitutes only a small ratio of the JEREMIE-program, credit 
and guarantee constitute a much larger share in it (EIF, 2014). Moreover, venture capital is 
not listed as a financial tool in some of the countries and regions that participate in the 
JEREMIE-program. While the JEREMIE-initiative is applicable on a regional level, the 
CIP/EIP work at an EU member state level. The JEREMIE-program is basically a 
complementary program to the CIP/EIP. 
Due to the regional nature of the program and the relatively small size of the participating 
venture capital funds, experts did not consider the JEREMIE-scheme’s effect on the venture 
capital market very significant (EP DG, 2012). Expert analyses that examined the efficiency 
of financial tools applied in the EU to promote innovation weren’t fully satisfied with the 
applied constructions and recommended their restructuring. They highlighted – from an 
economies of scale perspective – the too small, domestic regional funds and the low growth 
potential of the companies financed by them as the main concerns, and in their view there 
should be a shift towards a lesser number yet adequately flexible funds that are capable to 
adapt to investment trends (Reid and Nightingale, 2011). 
The JEREMIE-programme is important in the Central Eastern European region because, 
besides the technological boom of the 2000’s, innovation financing in the region has been less 
than dominant (Karsai, 2010). In this context the creation of JEREMIE-funds that combine 
EU and private resources was a definite step forward, even if due to the lengthy introduction 
process their operation in the region was launched only in 2010. This scheme is extremely 
important to new EU member states because it represents a clear shift from the previously 
common venture capital market operation where exclusively state resources were invested via 
state-owned venture capital fund management companies. While all Central Eastern European 
member states joined the JEREMIE program by the end of 2013, venture capital is missing 
from the profile of some holding funds that theoretically finance credit, guarantee and venture 
capital funds in some countries in the region. The appearance of hybrid funds does not mean 
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that the previous, direct public financing of venture capital investments ceased to operate 
when the JEREMIE-funds appeared on the scene. 
The JEREMIE program enables member states to use a part of their share from the structural 
fund to finance small and medium-size enterprises with the supervision of their own 
managing authorities in a repayable and reusable way. The managing authority first sets up a 
holding fund to manage the resources, which selects the intermediaries via tender for 
proposals who will allocate the resources to the actual beneficiaries in the form of equity, 
credit or guarantee. Such intermediary organizations can be commercial banks, saving banks, 
micro-financing organizations or venture capital fund management companies (KPMG, 
2011). 
The European Investment Fund fulfils an important role in the execution of European public 
venture capital programs by investing in 80 percent of all venture capital funds active in 
Europe. The EIF unites both public and private resources, and it participates in the financing 
of the European capital market in many different forms, may it be fund or fund of funds 
investments in the seed, early-stage and expansive small and medium-size companies in the 
technology sector. Besides EC-mandated management of equity financing allocated as part of 
the CIP program the EIF also manages 13 national and regional fund of funds and 14 
JEREMIE-holding funds as well (EIF, 2014). 
The EIF’s importance is reflected by the fact that through its €8 billion share capital portfolio 
at the end of 2013 it catalysed the fundraising of over €40 billion resources in 500 funds (EIF, 
2014). In case of these investments the EIF joins private investors and provides 15–40 percent 
of the funds’ equity at the first closure of the funds pari passu whereby professional private 
fund management companies do the fund management task (European Investment Group, 
2013). 
The overall professional evaluation of the EIF’s activity is positive. 30 percent of the funds 
financed by the EIF since 2011 wouldn’t have reached the set size and 60 percent wouldn’t 
have reached the first closure, therefore its role as a successful catalyst is underpinned 
(Kraemer-Eis et al., 2014). However, it was criticized that in practice the EIF prefers larger 
size venture capital funds that have a proven track record and not necessarily inclusive 
towards new, emerging teams or small funds that manage less than €70–80 million (French 
non paper, 2013). 
In regards to the government’s participation in the venture capital market as an investor the 
question of potential distortions to the competition arises, that is when does equity provided to 
enterprises in the form of venture capital qualify as state aid that ensures competitive 
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advantage to affected participants. Therefore the European Commission prepared its Risk 
Capital Guidelines in 2006 for state subsidies that have been amended several times in 
response to the dangers of market conditions. The directive for venture capital differs from the 
otherwise applicable state aid regulations in that it doesn’t prescribe the individual listing of 
eligible costs and the calculation of support intensity based on it, but in case of venture capital 
it requires only an assessment for compatibility of the full amount of capital contribution – the 
private investor share included (EC, 2011; Nicolaides, 2013). In practice, authorities that 
develop public equity investment programs must do so while getting prior approval from the 
EU through a notification process, so that all elements of the construction would comply with 
the relevant directive. Central and Eastern European authorities that used EU funds to develop 
their venture capital industry between 2006 and 2014, and investors and enterprises that 
wished to participate in government equity programs only faced the strict and – compared 
with their national practices – very restrictive nature of EU expectations only in the course of 
the notification of their programs. The compatibility criteria with state aid rules had a 
tremendous impact on the program’s efficiency and fruitfulness.2 
Assessment methods and areas of government venture capital programs 
In order to determine whether public venture capital investment programs are progressing in 
the right direction, that is they don’t result in effects contrary to the state’s interest, the 
launched program’s interim and the closed program’s post-evaluation are necessary. Its 
purpose is to establish whether the government venture capital programs achieved their 
objectives and expected results. Even though the seed and early-stage financing venture 
capital schemes have been utilized in a number of countries, according to a survey by Wilson–
Silva [2013] the programs were evaluated only in a few instances, namely in 13 out of the 32 
participating countries; while active and well-practiced grant, loan and guarantee schemes 
were evaluated in more locations – in 21 countries (Wilson–Silva, 2013). 
Solutions that offer public participation in the venture capital markets can be evaluated from 
many different viewpoints. The program planning can be analyzed to establish whether it was 
properly constructed. The process itself can also be examined, i.e. whether the intervention 
occurred according to plans, but even the program management can be examined to ascertain 
that its management was adequate. You can consider the institutional environment’s effect, in 
                                                 
2
Risk Capital Guidelines also contained requirements for venture capital funds, fund management companies and 
companies that receive capital investment. Thus they defined the criteria based on which the investor’s activity is 
defined as profit-driven – the basic requirement to exclude competitive advantage – and the guidelines also set 
the size, age, location and industry of companies entitled for certain amount and type of equity investment 
without qualifying as a state aid. 
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case of different programs, their eventual effect on each other, the interpretation of the 
program as well as the level of intervention, and to what results the program led to at a local, 
regional and national level. Assessment that takes into consideration different viewpoints and 
uses different evaluation methods will necessarily lead to different results and levels of 
utilization. It matters who conducts the evaluation, whether it is the executive organization of 
the program, another public organization, an independent external expert or the academic 
world. The evaluation can differ also based on whether a qualitative or quantitative approach 
was used during the analysis. 
The selected method obviously depends on the objective of the given program’s evaluation 
and the policy questions to be answered (HM Treasury, 2011). The assessment can ask 
whether the program was executed according to plans or what were the changes resulting 
from the program on the market that finances start-ups and early-stage companies, and what 
the costs and the benefits of the economic policy intervention were. In many cases the 
programs are evaluated against the results of similar domestic or foreign programs. The 
majority of assessment conducted in regards to venture capital programs in OECD countries 
was qualitative, and these evaluations were usually carried out by external experts or 
academic workers (OECD, 2013). 
It is useful if the evaluation is prepared not only for the participating venture capital funds and 
companies, but if the program’s effect in a wider context is also examined. Through the 
comparison of companies and entrepreneurial groups supported by the program with other 
companies that received no similar public support for their development, the program-induced 
differences become tangible. It is worth keeping a track of not only the financial results, but 
also changes in revenues and employment data for the two kinds of groups (Lerner, 2014). 
Naturally, such comparisons require a fairly widespread database. A database that enables the 
comparison between the effect of independent (private) and state venture capital investors’ 
activity on the revenues and employment figures of companies financed by them. This new 
approach was utilized in the VICO database that made it possible to measure on a 
representative sample the effect of venture capital financing on high tech companies in 
Europe between 1993 and 2010 (VICO, 2011). 
Even though the number of government venture capital investors is very prevalent in Europe 
and they have a significant weight at the level of syndication and co-financing with 
independent (private) venture capital investors, there was virtually no evaluation before 2012 
regarding the role government funds played in the growth of high tech companies in Europe. 
Analyses up to then only examined the characteristics of special governmental programs 
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outside Europe and what moderate effect public venture capital investors had on the 
performance of funds financed by private venture capital investors. 
It is relatively rare that already at the launch of the program the state would define conditions 
that allow for the obvious evaluation of the given equity investment program. Formal 
assessment and its publishing is not common practice. Evaluation by independent academic 
bodies is automatically difficult because data are accessible only to a limited extent about the 
programs. Internal governmental evaluations are also rare, but if they exist they tend not to be 
strict enough, lacking the adequate competences and are often biased. Most programs that use 
government resources do not set a method of evaluation or what kind of data should be 
collected for it. Formal assessments are often very superficial and refer only to the execution 
of the program (NAO, 2009). Lerner [2009] considered it a fundamental flaw that the 
evaluation of public programs that boost enterprise growth most of the time is not carried out. 
He found that even in cases where there was an assessment, it was limited to a compilation of 
success stories. He considered this practice disputable because the tacit requirement for 
success propelled investors to finance companies even where the role of public contribution 
was rather limited. In Lerner’s view the adequate assessment should have enquired into what 
would have happened without the government’s participation in the venture capital market. 
The European Union’s venture capital programs’ obligatory interim evaluations are usually 
descriptive and lack the intention to raise issues and explain them. In the reports on the equity 
program, data on venture capital is mixed with data from other types of programs that also 
assist the financing of small and medium-size enterprises. Such reports are usually compiled 
according to the viewpoint of the public administration, which is reflected in the fact that they 
mix data on credits, guarantees and equity, and they focus mainly on the number of 
contributing intermediaries and the number of deals carried out by them. It is difficult to see 
clearly since the data for the lending in the form of financial instruments when risk financing 
small and medium sized businesses, the data for equity financing, and the data on venture 
capital provided by institutional and informal venture capital investors are difficult to separate 
from one another in the statistical sources. When counting the state co- and joint risk 
financing investments, equity from public and private sources are often blurred together. 
Aspects affecting the efficiency of public venture capital programs 
The analysis of public venture capital programs highlights a number of features of the applied 
schemes that play an important role in the success of their execution. Among other things the 
preparation of the program and the time frame available for the execution, the formation of 
regulations that apply to investments of preferred venture capital fund managers, the 
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opportunity to extend the programs in space, the volume of capital available for investments, 
the selection of private investors, the incentive system used to attract them and the 
management of publicity are extremely important. 
The time frame for the program 
In terms of evaluation and actual effect timeframe plays an important role in the programs. 
According to precedent a lot of programs can only be launched very slowly, partly because of 
delays in acquiring the required co-financing, the obligatory procedure to evaluate the deal-
flow and the possible investment’s feasibility, as well as the long time required to recruit staff. 
The coordination of regulations on EU funds and legal requirements of the different venture 
capital schemes, like the settlement of regulatory contradictions in the case of venture capital 
funds financed by the ERDF, take a long time resulting in a long investment process. There is 
a risk that the investment ratio will not achieve the previously planned level because during 
the program period not all the available equity can be invested (Tillvaxtverket, 2011). In 
Latvia, for example, more than half of the JEREMIE-program’s time frame was spent with 
establishing of the legal and institutional framework, the selection of intermediaries, the 
setting-up of the funds and advertising the call for proposals (Michie–Wishlade, 2012). 
Investment restrictions 
It is a fundamental problem when the concept that the “market dictates” is ignored. It is 
contrary to the nature of venture capital to predefine what areas it should finance; more 
precisely such practice itself reduces the potentially acquirable success rate (EVCA, 2010). 
One cannot predict what the fields and industries with adequate number of fast-growing 
companies will be, or where breakthrough inventions will be made that could be supported by 
venture capital. Therefore it is unfortunate to limit the project selection only to a certain group 
of companies in case of public programs (EC, 2012). 
Government programs often sought to promote the financing of industries and geographical 
regions where there was no capital interest. Such efforts resulted in a waste of resources. A 
similar fundamental problem is when the program allow support of only certain elements in 
the entrepreneurial process. For example, if the participating venture capital funds can finance 
companies only at a certain phase or a defined size or age. Programs can also prescribe what 
kind of securities can be purchased by the investors; moreover, government schemes can 
influence the later fortune of financed companies by limiting company acquisitions or 
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secondary buy-outs. These restrictions may be understandable from a governmental policy 
point of view, but they go against the entrepreneurial process. It creates an obvious 
contradiction that the objectives of the public and the private sector might not necessarily 
overlap. There is a potential conflict of interests between the social and economic 
development objectives of the state and that of the profit-driven private sector. This can 
manifest primarily in early-stage or risky innovative projects where the state seeks to support 
the start-up and innovative companies, while private fund managers interpret it as the 
undermining of the accessible profit potential of the program. While the development of small 
and medium-size enterprises and the promotion of innovation is the state’s main objective, for 
the profit-oriented private investors it is only a by-product (Meyer, 2007; Michie–Wishlade, 
2012). 
The program’s geographical extension 
One of the typical mistakes of government programs is that they prescribe that only domestic 
enterprises are eligible for the funds (Lerner, 2009). On one hand, only those early stage 
financing venture capital funds can become successful that are considered to be worthy by 
international investors as well, which contradicts the geographical limitation of the 
investment. On the other hand equity from governmental sources can flood the market, but if 
it is not capable of absorbing it, that can be detrimental to market processes (Lerner, 2009). In 
the end, the territorial limitation related to government schemes goes contrary to the principle 
that public funds must entrust the selection of attractive offers to the markets. Therefore even 
a regional focus should be avoided, if possible, because this way programs cannot operate 
efficiently. The regional restriction can have an adverse effect on performance if there are not 
enough numbers of good investment opportunities or there is no adequate infrastructure in 
place. A different tool should be used for this development objective (EC, 2012). 
During realization of public equity programs the international nature of the entrepreneurial 
process is often ignored. In the venture capital industry the promise of capital for fund 
investors and the expenses of investments and enterprises increasingly reach over country 
borders and to different continents. Therefore failure is sure to ensue if the local 
entrepreneurial sector and venture capital industry is built without global connections. In 
addition, companies that grew strong with public venture capital can often become the target 
of foreign private equity investors even before they are fully fledged. In such cases the full 
potential of the government-supported investee occurs beyond the country borders and thus it 
doesn’t contribute to growth, job creation and innovation in the given country. It is very 
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difficult and senseless to resist such trends and this requires a new kind of assessment on the 
promotion side (Carpentier and Suret, 2014). 
The size of venture capital funds 
State intervention must serve the efficiency and long-term stability of the venture capital 
sector. For this, the government must cooperate with the business world in its programs. At 
the same time it must also pay attention to not to crowd private investors out of the market, 
but it should not generate a proliferation of small funds that are not capable of adequately 
exploiting economies of scale either. While too small programs can have little effect, 
programs that are too large risk flooding the local market, therefore neither too small nor too 
large funds are a good solution. 
The equity of smaller funds is not sufficient to adequately diversify the funds' investments and 
if they lack adequate resources they cannot employ experienced fund managers either. The 
material compiled by the European Commission in September 2009 (EC, 2009) mentions a 
“vicious circle” consisting of small funds, low yields and low investor interest in the funds 
that can be altered only by venture capital funds of a European scale. 
The operation of regional funds structure in the United Kingdom shows a lack of fund 
management companies experienced in early-stage investments, and that regional funds 
proved to be too small to be financially viable, that is to manage the greater risk resulting 
from their limited diversification. They couldn’t finance the follow-on financing rounds at the 
same companies, and they were unable to compensate the high ratio of fixed costs either 
(Mason and Harrison, 2003). The inadequate fund size and the limitation of investments 
according to size as well as the limitations of geographical location have proved to be equally 
detrimental to the profitability of investments (NESTA, 2009). According to the British data, 
£50 million was the minimum size that still enabled an efficient operation, while an even 
bigger size was justified for early stage or life sciences specified funds. It turned out that an 
adequate number – at least 20 – investments are required for diversification at the different 
funds. 
A bigger sized fund – through its better diversification – can reduce risks, i.e. if investments 
are better spread among the different life-cycles and geographical locations. Therefore the 
fund of funds construction promises to be a better choice for the government, even if the 
intermediary fund management fee makes this solution more expensive; public participation 
itself makes the operation of funds more costly due to the required reports, compliance with 
the regulations and the coordination tasks. 
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A bigger fund size entails a higher attraction for institutional investors since the investment 
threshold of certain institutions allows them to invest only in bigger funds (EVCA, 2010). If 
institutional investors can invest in government-sponsored venture capital funds then potential 
risks for both parties might diminish. As a prerequisite for this regulation institutional 
investors must make the selection of venture capital as an asset class a viable option. 
The selection and incentives of private fund managers 
Precedent indicates that the formation and realization of the financing scheme plays an 
important role in how much the given program can meet the objectives of the state. For a 
successful operation of the programs the most seasoned and experienced fund managers must 
be recruited. If there are not enough experts in the domestic market with the right experience, 
foreign fund managers must be included in the programs. These experts should be able to help 
the portfolio companies so they would become international, get listed on the stock exchange 
and they should be such investors who could offer an advantageous syndication with the local 
fund management companies (EC, 2012). 
The structures generally used to stimulate financing differ according to the following criteria: 
how they divide profit, how they stage investments and how they compensate losses for 
private and public investors of hybrid funds. The limitation of profit that public investors can 
get increases the profit private investors can gain from the business. The drawing of 
government funds prior to the private equity can also be beneficial to the private sector co-
financing partners because it reduces the investment period for them. The guarantee to cover a 
part of losses that private sector investors encounter will also protect these actors from the 
economic consequences of an unsuccessful project (Murray, 2007). The examination of 
hybrid funds through a simulation method (Jaaskelainen et al., 2007) made it possible to 
identify the criteria in terms of profit division and compensation systems that still enable a 
profitable operation even for early-stage hybrid venture capital funds. According to the 
calculations of Jaaskelainen et al. [2007] the asymmetric timing of contributions and 
disbursements was the only incentive that could truly attract private investors to the early-
stage market segment, in a field where the expected yield of specialized funds were 
significantly lower than those of private funds in general. An important conclusion of the 
analysis was that no hybrid solution proved to be sufficient in the event of moderate or severe 
market failure; i.e. other measures are required to fill this equity gap. Governments in such 
cases will not be able to increase the equity supply for early-stage financing in the long-run 




Offering government investment and support always entails the threat of abuse (Florida and 
Smith, 1993; Leleux et al., 1998). Resulting from personal and political connections, and 
intentional misuse the subsidiaries often end up not at the enterprise circle that the subsidy 
was meant to support, therefore central funds in the end do not serve the public. This is 
particularly true for subsidies where there are no clearly set requirements or where public 
investors are rarely checked or not checked at all. 
Regulatory capture is not unprecedented in government funding schemes, when private and 
public sector participants try to acquire the direct and indirect subsidies offered by the state. 
For example, when the beneficiaries of the programmes meant to promote start-ups end up 
being program managers or friends with the legislators (Lerner, 2014). So that political 
pressure could be excluded from the selection process of funds and portfolio companies that 
participate in governmental equity programs, a transparent decision-making process is 
required that is similar to the one customarily used in the private sector. Experience tells that 
the smaller the amount to be awarded, the bigger number of bodies decide about its allocation 
and the smaller the role of subjective evaluation in the scoring system the smaller chance 
there is to exert political pressure (EC, 2012). 
In summary, experts conducting the evaluation consider the elimination of the narrow 
timeframes and the contradictions caused by the different timings according to the origin of 
the funds, a clear establishment of rules already at the launch of the programs, the extension 
of the group of final beneficiaries and the strengthening of clear vision in regards to 
applicable legislation to be the most vital aspects determining the success of an operation. 
Although it may pose a great temptation to policy experts, administration should seek to avoid 
micro-managing the entrepreneurial process, that is they must avoid over-regulating the 
financial construction. 
The outcome of public venture capital programs 
According to analyses direct government venture capital programs had a worse performance 
than the ones operating on business principles (Armour and Cumming, 2006, Da Rin et al., 
2006, del-Palacio et al., 2012, Leleux andSurlemont, 2003, Lerner et al., 2011, Murray, 1998, 
NAO, 2009). These evaluations essentially indicated that public funds are generally smaller, 
are invested in fewer companies and have a smaller average size of investment. Their 
investments realized a yield less frequently, therefore were less likely to exit profitably, and 
their yields – the internal rate of return – was all in all lower than that of average private funds 
in the United Kingdom and the United States. To sum up the results, researchers measured a 
positive, yet statistically weak effect for public venture capital investors and in general their 
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effect was less compared with the results of other independent (private) fund managers 
(Balboa et al., 2007, Manigart and Bauselick, 2001). 
According to Grilli and Martinu [2013b] the reason for the ineffectiveness of government 
schemes in stimulating  revenues in high tech companies was not due to the bad availability of 
financing resources, but more to the lack of expertise  that would provide added value. In 
Ryan’s [1990] evaluation the Australian Management and Investment Companies (MIC) 
program proved to be unsuccessful because only less efficient private investors could be 
included in the program, whose exit strategies were also limited. In case of some state-
incentivised investments there was political pressure as well, while structural problems could 
have also contributed to the less efficient decision-making and the relatively lower added 
value the program achieved (Murray et al., 2012). 
The differences between success stories in different countries could be explained with the 
different structures of the programs. One such feature is whether the public and private 
venture capital funds competed on the same market with each other that, resulting from less 
strict public investor expectations, led to the crowding-out of private funds from the market. It 
is worth taking a look at the analysis of Becker and Hellmann [2003], who examined the 
failure of Deutsche Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft (WFG), the German Venture Financing 
Corporation. They pointed out that a main element of the failure was that in order to boost 
bank investments the state undertook a 75 percent guarantee for losses that generated 
conflicting interests between the government and the banks from the very beginning. Another 
reason for the failure was that shareholders of the investor company did not seek to maximize 
the shareholder value, and contracts provided little guarantee for investors while the 
management structure also impeded value creation for venture capitalists and audits at the 
portfolio companies. 
Even where the government programmes focused on companies working on highly promising 
technological innovations, the results measured by the researchers were still perplexing. Such 
was the case of the Australian Pre-Seed Fund established in 2002. In analyzing this fund 
Cumming [2007] pointed out that their investments did not target innovative or high-tech 
companies more intensively than other funds of the same size. It occurred despite the fact that 
the above target was specifically prescribed by the regulations that govern fund managers. 
The situation was similar at the regional government funds; their activity – according to 
Murray [1998] – promoted innovation to a lesser extent than those private funds that sought 
out new technology based companies for their investments. Such innovative companies were 
more often found among the investment of private funds than among companies financed by 
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public regional funds, even though they believed to be doing the very opposite. Jaaskelainen 
et al. [2007] claim that presumably the management and operational problems of the funds 
resulted in the outcome that a fund specifically targeted at high tech companies did not 
provide more support to such firms than other funds not specialized in this field. 
The failure of regional funds introduced in the United Kingdom was made more severe by the 
fact that the selected scheme ignored the problems of the demand side from the very 
beginning (Murray et al., 2012). Thus regional fund investors specialized on early-stage 
companies encountered a number of obstacles in terms of investment opportunities (Mason 
and Harrison, 2003). Nightingale et al. [2009] came to a similar conclusion when they 
established that it is overly simplistic and misleading to consider the financing challenges of 
small and medium-size UK companies merely a supply problem that can be tackled simply by 
providing more funds. According to their paper the problem in the United Kingdom presented 
itself both on the demand and the supply side. The demand side was characterized by a lack of 
companies with a high growth potential, worthy of investment. On the supply side – besides 
the high costs – the difficulty to find each other and sign agreements posed a challenge both 
for investors and enterprises alike. 
The previously mentioned crowding-out effect (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006, Leleux and 
Surlemont, 2003) also works against the efficiency of public venture capital programs. 
Government investments can not only complement, but as an unwished consequence they 
could also substitute private investments. The reason for this is that if public investors 
compete for the same deal with private investors, the former can push up the prices and 
reduce the yields. Public investors can offer more for a deal than private venture capital 
investors since there are no institutional investors behind them in their funds who would 
require an explanation for the low yields generated. Private investors could be discouraged by 
governmental presence even in this way. If private investors avoid risk and overestimate the 
expected presence of government investors in the market, they might reduce their own 
presence to a greater extent than public investors actually contribute to it, which can result in 
them being crowded-out (Li and Wu, 2008). 
Such a crowding-out effect was observed by Cumming and MacIntosh [2006] regarding 
Canada. The authors found that the Canadian Labor Sponsored Venture Capital Corporation 
(LSVCC) program had a significant exclusion effect, and the primary reason for it was the 
extremely large tax break that LSVCCs received. Following the launch of the program the 
LSVCC sector experienced a massive expansion, contrary to a small reduction that occurred 
in terms of private venture capital. There was an additional structural problem, and it caused a 
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significantly weaker performance by state investors, that, since public fund managers had a lot 
of equity at their disposal, individual fund manager handled a lot more deals than their 
counterparts at private venture capital funds. The consequence was less efficient decision-
making, worse selection and more limited due diligence, a weaker corporate governance and 
low added value consultancy (Cumming and Johan, 2013a). Similar data was found for 
crowding-out and for not crowding-in private capital in the sample that included Western 
Europe, Canada and the USA by Armour and Cumming [2006]. Da Rin et al. [2006] proved 
the exclusion effect with similar data from Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe the 
crowding-out effect of public venture capital investments prior to joining the EU was 
presented by Karsai [2013]. 
Interestingly, even in regards to community equity schemes financed by EU funds the 
possibility of eventual exclusion was raised, even though funds financed by the European 
Union were always operating on market principles. A number of national authorities that 
participate in the community equity programs of the EU were surprised to find that the EIB 
and EIF applied strict profit-oriented approach in their investments, since they believed that 
such institutions will act as supportive partner institutions of the community, and not as 
bankers. This is why they thought it was possible that these very organizations would exclude 
the “real” private investors from the market (Michie–Wishlade, 2012). It seemed to have been 
confirmed when a number of private investors simply avoided investing in funds that received 
EIF capital. According to representatives of the national authorities if all private investors 
accepted the criteria only the EIF did not then fund managers would have to choose between 
EIF and their own private investors. Representatives of the EIB and EIF – who invested 
community resources into the funds – argued that in terms of state aid they count as private 
investors. They believed that the relatively high contribution and the higher yield expected by 
the private fund managers was the most important tool in harmonizing the interests of fund 
managers and investors (King, 2013). 
Empirical results in some studies report not exclusion, but to the contrary, the increase of 
resources available in the private sector, i.e. the inclusion of private sector equity into the 
venture capital market. For example according to data by Cumming [2007] the Australian 
Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) program gave a significant boost to the Australian venture 
capital market in the 90s. The Australian IIF program’s success was largely due to its 
structure. The government could act as an institutional investor to private investors and it 
resulted in an increase of early stage venture capital investments. There was no direct 
competition between public and private investors; they enjoyed a cooperation similar to 
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partnership between them. The Australian IIF program contributed to the increase of venture 
capital investments while they achieved a smaller portfolio per fund management company, a 
more intensive investment phasing and syndicated, that is jointly executed, investments 
(Cumming and Johan, 2013a). Companies with an IIF background proved to be more 
intensive in R&D, they reported patents relatively more frequently, and made a more 
successful appearance on the stock exchange (IPO), in other terms they achieved a higher 
market capitalization (Cumming and Johan, 2013a, 2013b). Data revealed that government 
programs in the USA and Israel were also successful in boosting the venture capital market 
(Lerner, 2009). Following the initial governmental support the venture capital industry could 
succeed in Israel without any support, a result of among others the strong ties that formed 
between Israeli entrepreneurs and foreign investors (Avnimelech and Teubal, 2008; Jeng and 
Wells, 2008). 
Mid-term evaluation of the Swedish regional venture capital program was also positive 
(Tillvaxtverket, 2011). Companies that received equity in general were satisfied with their 
relationship to venture capital funds and private co-investors as well. The equity enabled them 
to grow faster, it provided them access to more external financing, it resulted in an increased 
production capacity and more professional company work, greater expertise and higher 
profitability. Experts who evaluated the Swedish scheme say that it was difficult to answer 
whether the programme increased capital supply for companies and the equity market or not, 
but they believed that there were signs for the reduction of the equity gap and attraction of 
private capital, which in the end confirm the additional effect of the measure. According to 
the survey without the governmental co-financing of venture capital funds approximately half 
of the private co-investors would not have invested, while others would have undertaken less 
investments, that is the volume of private equity increased and no crowding-out effect 
towards private funds could be experienced (Tillvaxtverket, 2011). 
According to an international survey conducted by Brander et al. [2014] the contributional 
benefits of public venture capital are confirmed negating its crowding-out effect. Based on 
data collected in the examined countries the higher number of public venture capital 
investments resulted in a higher capital per company and more companies could access 
venture capital. According to the survey companies that received both public and private 
venture capital accessed more equity than companies financed only by private venture capital 
investors, and significantly more if they had access only to government venture capital. 
Resulting from the additional effect the authors found a positive correlation between 
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companies that accessed both public and private venture capital and the successful exit rates 
from the investments. 
The debate is far from being closed regarding the utility of government venture capital 
programs. In recent years – in the wake of the successful Australian and some Asian state 
programs – a lot of countries have re-evaluated their stance on the exclusion effect. It was also 
proved that the evaluation of this effect greatly depended on the indicators that researchers 
used for their calculations (Cumming, 2011, 2013). 
In assessing the results of successful government participation, additional, very important data 
came from research that compared the performance of companies that received venture capital 
either from the public or from the private sector. The analysis carried out by Nightingale et al. 
[2009] did not indicate a better performance for UK companies that accessed venture capital 
in the hybrid form than the ones that did not receive public venture capital. 
Beside the effect of the volume of public contribution on the efficiency of hybrid funds’ 
operations researchers also wanted to know whether the weight of government participation 
influences the success rate of the financed companies. Research conducted by Brander et al. 
[2010] is one of these studies where the authors examined the effects of government venture 
capital in other areas besides growth, such as the conclusion of the investor’s initial public 
offering (IPO), the sale of the investee to a third party and the patent applications. A positive 
effect was found only in those cases where the government contribution to the entire private 
and public investment was relatively low. This is why Brander et al. [2010] claim that those 
companies that received venture capital both from private and public investors realized a 
better performance in the exits, and especially in terms of IPO and trade sale, than their 
counterparts who received venture capital only from private investors. This positive effect 
was present only when a moderate share of the equity came from public venture capital funds. 
Where government venture capital investment shares were higher than 50 percent, the 
performance of investees proved to be relatively worse. In cases of moderate government 
intervention only those fund management companies performed better where the fund 
manager was not owned by the government. 
From studies that compare public and private investments, it transpires that investees financed 
by public funds – yet fewer than 50 percent – reached the best performance. These companies 
had better results than their peers financed only by private sector funds. Meaning that from 
the three possible variations of venture capital funds only the partially government-financed 
version produced the best results, contrary to the fully public or exclusively private funds. 
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Therefore Brander et al. [2010] concluded that government venture capital investors can 
provide assistance with certain funds, financial contribution included, while they are less 
useful if they exercise full control over business decisions. If they do not exercise full control 
the concerns of altering the business perspective, which arise due to the state’s alternative 
objectives, will be less prevalent. According to research, governmental promotion can be most 
efficient if it remains under the management of private venture capital investors. There is a 
big difference therefore between state-owned and state-sponsored venture capital management 
companies. 
Brander et al. [2012] later made a global analysis on the effect of public venture capital 
investors and they confirmed the previously presented findings. During the project 
commissioned by the World Economic Forum they examined 28 800 enterprises in 126 
countries that received venture capital financing between 2000 and 2008 (Word Economic 
Forum, 2010). The analysis examined the effect of public involvement in venture capital in 
terms of value creation, innovation and employment. It examined direct capital investment in 
case of state-owned venture capital funds, at privately managed hybrid funds that were 
financed both by private and public investors; and it also analyzed subsidies and tax breaks 
provided to venture capital investors. The study concluded that the best performance was 
achieved when public venture capital was at a moderate level. The existing yet moderate 
public venture capital activity contributes to value creation and innovation; contrary to 
venture capital that is 100 percent private or public. The research found that value creation 
was best supported by public venture capital through legitimization. The performance of the 
investees grows when the public venture capital investment is managed by private 
management companies. Other analyses came to similar conclusions. 
For example, Grilli and Murtinu [2013a] sought to give an estimate –using a longitudinal 
European database – on the effect governmental venture capital investors have on European 
high tech companies’ growth compared with independent (private) venture capital investors. 
Researchers on one hand examined whether the two investor types have a positive impact of 
the companies separately, and on the other hand – having regard to the already existing 
syndication and co-investment activity between the two investor groups – they also analyzed 
whether the investment order of the two types of investor groups is relevant or not. In the end, 
they also examined whether government capital investment following financing from 
independent (private) venture capital investors generates any significant difference, that is 
whether the simultaneous presence of the two investors is advantageous or not during first 
round of investments to the portfolio companies. Researchers found that in the seven 
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European markets they examined new technology based and public venture capital supported 
companies would have followed a similar growth pattern even without the initial government 
involvement. Therefore, they think that public venture capital investors do not have a 
significant impact on the revenues of new technology based companies, while private venture 
capital investors had a positive and remarkable effect on the turnover growth of these 
companies, independent from which stage the new, technology-based firm received the first 
such investment. This handling effect was greater for very young companies in case of 
independent (private) investors, while in case of public investors this effect was not recorded. 
The only exception, i.e. the public venture capital investor played a positive role only when 
the public and the private venture capitalists jointly financed the investees and they aimed at 
relatively young, technology based companies (Grilli and Murtinu, 2013b). 
According to the authors’ analysis, independent (private) venture capitalists had a positive and 
statistically more significant impact on the turnover growth of high tech companies, while 
they measured no such effect among public venture capital investors. It means that between 
2003 and 2010 government venture capital investments had no measurable or significant 
impact on the growth of European start-up high-tech companies neither in terms of revenues 
nor in employment figures. The financing had a revenue-boosting effect when the public and 
private players syndicated, that is, co-invested in the companies so that the state investor was 
subordinate to the private investor. Therefore the participation of government venture capital 
investors in the venture capital financing had a positive impact on company growth only if the 
public investors did not have a leading role in the syndicate. In all other cases, even when the 
investors were exclusively government funds or their investment preceded or followed the 
investment of independent (private) funds, their participation in European high-tech 
companies had no impact whatsoever neither on the revenues, nor on employment figures 
(Grilli and Murtinu, 2013b). Research conducted by Grilli and Murtinu shed a negative light 
on the government’s ability to promote high-tech companies on the venture capital market 
through direct fund management. This research also confirms the previously quoted results of 
Brander et al. [2012] who found that the performance of companies financed by a syndicate 
grows if the public venture capital investors have a minority role compared with when they 
have a majority role. 
Based on their analysis of public venture capital fund managers researchers found that even if 
the European venture capital market needs governmental support, state intervention must 
primarily create an advantageous environment for venture capital initiatives and not utilize a 
hands-on approach when it directly invests state funds. Measures acting on the supply alone 
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will not be enough to ensure the viable operation of the venture capital industry (Meyer, 2007; 
Murray et al., 2012). Therefore the European Union is right to promote a higher number of 
fast growing high tech companies by strengthening the underdeveloped venture capital 
industry. On the other hand the hands-on policy, whereby the governmental bodies apply a 
“we can do it on our own” investment strategy, is remarkably ineffective. Instead, cooperation 
between governmental and independent (private) venture capital investors and their joint 
targeting of new technology based companies could be the way forward (Grilli and Murtinu, 
2013a). 
Summary 
State subsidies to the venture capital market can be justified based on three criteria. Firstly, 
the participation must have a real positive effect on the companies and the economy. 
Secondly, there must be a market failure present in the given segment. Thirdly, this market 
insufficiency must be reduced or eliminated by the relevant public measures. The objective of 
financial engineering instruments applied in the venture capital market is to enable their 
profit-oriented utilization in order to boost the private sector and to more efficiently reach 
economic policy objectives. 
Since the venture capital market is moved by the private sector, all government intervention 
naturally entails the risk of market distortions. Therefore the state must seek to distort the 
market to the least extent, and this effect should last as short as possible, it shouldn’t be 
bureaucratic and finally, it should happen with full publicity and accompanied by independent 
assessment. 
In recent decades the government participation on the venture capital market as an investor 
has undergone a significant change. In the beginning the state had a direct role that also 
entailed the risk of distorting the market processes, but nowadays the government tends to 
participate in the venture capital market in more indirect ways. These are mechanisms where 
the government entrusts private sector fund managers and prompts them to reach objectives 
important for the state in their venture capital investments. An indirect scheme could be 
organised among others where there is a venture capital fund created jointly from state and 
private resources, and the private funds selected based on prior agreement that the state fund 
joins as a partner, or a holding construction as a “fund of funds” that offers public equity to 
private fund management companies via call for proposals. 
From browsing the program evaluations it transpires that the analysis of these schemes is 
fairly underdeveloped or only formal. In most cases the evaluation criteria weren’t even set at 
the program launch, and in lack of the right indicators only qualitative evaluations were 
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carried out, and the differences in the programs hardly made it possible to make comparisons 
between the countries. Despite the lacking formal evaluations the assessments make it clear 
what main criteria define the success of government venture capital programs. These are the 
following: the duration that allows the programs to be completed, the size of the venture 
capital funds created as part of the governmental programs, the minimizing of limitations 
applicable to investment deals, the offering of incentives to private fund investors working 
together with the state in the form of profit share, the selection of private investors based on 
objective criteria, and publicity of the venture capital investment programs. 
International experience confirms that the government’s participation as an investor is not a 
paradox – a square out of a circle –, but an adequately formed mechanism that can contribute 
to the easing of imperfections on the venture capital market. The appearance and active 
participation of the government on the venture capital market cannot be limited only to ease 
the lack of capital supply. In order to phase this approach out, the state must make the 
financing of the socially important enterprises attractive to private sector investors, that is, it 
must mitigate the uneven supply of private investors' funds in the venture capital industry. 
The state’s participation in the venture capital market can be only a temporary solution, since 
providing venture capital is a business activity at its core. If public intervention does not result 
in making the private sector more active, the government is confined to a role that it can fulfil 
only with continuously growing budgetary burdens. The state would like to hand the 
financing role over to the private sector in the long run, but it requires that all its roles would 
be absolutely compatible with standards applicable in the private sector and it must come on 
stage as a reliable investment partner. In this sense there should be a difference between the 
yield expectations of the state as an investor from the way the given investment organization 
selects the enterprises to be financed and define the yield expected of them. If the state’s 
participation as an investor is successful, in its wake private sector investors become willing 
to finance the enterprises considered to be important by the state, therefore the development 
of economic function and the venture capital industry can occur simultaneously, and in due 
course private investors can take over the government’s direct participation in the market. If 
this is how the state interprets its role on the venture capital market, the public contribution to 
the venture capital shall not be mixed with state aid provided to companies under the disguise 
of venture capital. The objective of the state is not to support individual companies out of 
competition, but should be to strengthen the competitiveness of the economy, and promote 




Armour, J. – Cumming, D. J. [2006]: The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley. Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol. 58., No. 4., pp. 596–635. 
Avnimelech, G. – Teubal, M. [2008]: From direct support of business sector R&D/Innovation 
to targeting venture capital/private equity: A catching-up innovation and technology policy 
life cycle perspective. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Vol. 17., No. 1–2., pp. 
153–172. 
Avnimelech, G.– Teubal, M. [2006]: Creating venture capital industries that co-evolve with 
high-tech: insights from an extended industry life cycle perspective of the Israeli experience. 
Research Policy, Vol. 35., No. 10, pp. 1466–1498. 
Balboa, M.– Marti, J. – Zieling, N. [2007]: Is the Spanish public sector effective in backing 
venture capital? In: Gregoriou, G. N. – Koolo, M. – Kraussl, R. (eds.): Venture Capital in 
Europe. Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 115–128. 
Becker, R. M. – Hellmann, T. F. [2003]: The Genesis of Venture Capital – Lessons from the 
German Experience. CESifo Working Paper, No. 883. 
Brander, J. – Hellmann, T. – Du, Q. [2010]: The Effects of Government-Sponsored Venture 
Capital: International Evidence. Working Paper 16521., National Bureau of Economic 
Research. Downloaded from: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16521 
Brander, J. A. – Du, Q. – Hellmann, T. F. [2012]: The Effects of Government-Sponsored 
Venture Capital: International Evidence. Working Paper. Downloaded from: 
http://strategy.sauder.ubc.cs/hellmann/pdfs/BranderDuHellmannApril2012.pdf 
Brander, J. A. – Du, Q. – Hellmann, T. F. [2014]: The Effects of Government-Sponsored 
Venture Capital: International Evidence. Review of Finance, 2014, pp. 1–48. Review of 
Finance Advance Access published March 17, 2014. 
Carpentier, C. – Suret, J. M. [2014]: Post-Investment Migration of Canadian Venture Capital-
Backed New Technology-Based Firms. Cirano, Monteral, April, Social Science Research 
Network. Downloaded from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2444976. 
Cumming, D. J. [2007]: Government policy towards entrepreneurial finance: Innovation 
Investments Funds, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 22., No. 2., pp. 193–235. 
Cumming, D. J. [2011]: Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets. 
Venture Capital. An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Vol. 13., No. 1., pp. 
75–94. 
Cumming, D. J. [2013]: Public Economic Gone Wild: Lessons from Venture Capital. 




Cumming, D. J. – Johan, S. A. [2013a]: Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting. 2nd 
Edition, Elsevier Science Academic Press 
Cumming, D. J. – Johan, S. [2013b]: Venture's Economic Impact in Australia. Journal of 
Technology Transfer, forthcoming 
Cumming, D. J. – MacIntosh, J. G. [2006]: Crowding out private equity: Canadian evidence. 
Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 21., No. 5., pp. 569–609. 
Da Rin, M. – Hellmann, T. F – Puri, M. [2011]: A Survey of Venture Capital Research. 
NBER Working Paper, No. 17523. Downloaded from: http:/www.nber.org/papers/w17523 
Da Rin, M. – Nicodano, G. – Sembenelli, A. [2006]: Public policy and the creation of active 
venture capital markets. Journal of Public Economics, 90., pp. 1699–1723. 
del-Palacio, I. – Zhang, X. T. – Sole, F. [2012]: The capital gap for small technology 
companies: public venture capital to rescue? Small Business Economics, April, Vol. 38., No. 
3., pp. 283–301. 
EC [2009]: Financing innovation and SMEs. Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels 
EC [2011]: State aid Scoreboard. Report on State aid contribution to Europe 2020 Strategy. 
Brussels, 22.6.2011, COM(2011) 356 final 
EC [2012]: Potential of Venture Capital in the European Union. Directorate General for 
International Policies. Policy Department A, Economic and Scientific Policy Industry, 
Research and Energy, p. 90. 
Economist [2014]: Innovation by fiat. European venture capital. The Economist, May 17., pp. 
62–63. 
EIB [2013]: About EIF & its Venture Capital activity. EIB, 02. 
EIF [2014]: Annual Report 2013. European Investment Fund 
EP DG [2012]: Potential of Venture Capital in the European Union. European Parliament. 
Directorate-General for International Policies, p. 73. 
European Commission [2013]: Summary of data on the progress made in financing and 
implementing financial engineering instruments co-financed by Structural Funds. September 
European Investment Group [2012]: Supporting small and medium-sized enterprises in 2012. 
A joint report of the European Commission and the European Investment Bank Group. 2013. 
May 2., p. 5. 
EVCA [2010]: Closing gaps and moving up a gear: The next stage of venture capital's 
evolution in Europe. European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association, EVCA Venture 




EVCA CEE [2014]: Central and Eastern Europe Statistics 2013. An EVCA Special Paper. Ed. 
by the EVCA Central and Eastern Europe Task Force, August. European Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association, Zaventem, Belgium. 
EVCA Yearbook [2014]: EVCA Yearbook 2014. EVCA, Zaventem, Belgium. 
Florida, R. – Smith, D. F. [1993]: Keep the Government out of Venture Capital. Issues in 
Science and Technology, No. 9., pp. 61–69. 
French non paper [2013]: The case for a European Venture capital fund for innovative 
companies. EU position paper, 01324EN, p. 3. 
Gilson, R. J. [2003]: Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience. Paper presented at the Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and 
Governance in a New Era of Cross Border Deals. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55., No. 4., 
April, pp. 1067–1103. 
Grilli, L. – Martinu, S. [2013b]: New Technology-based Firms in Europe: Market Penetration, 
Public Venture Capital and Timing of Investment. Downloaded from: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1892024 
Grilli, L. – Murtinu, S. [2013a]: Government, venture capital and the growth of European 
high-tech entrepreneurial firms. SSRN Working Paper Series. Downloaded from: 
http//ssrn.com/abstract=2066867 
Grilli, L. – Murtinu, S. [2014]: Government, venture capital and the growth of European high-
tech entrepreneurial firms. Research Policy, Vol. 43,, No. 9., November, pp. 1523–1543 
Downloaded from: http//dxdoi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.04.002. 
HM Treasury [2011]: The Magenta Book: Guidance for evaluation. HM Treasury, London, 
Government Social Research Unit. 
Jaaskelainen, M. – Maula, M. – Murray, G. [2007]: Profit Distribution and Compensation 
Structures in Publicly and Privately Funded Hybrid Venture Capital Funds. Research Policy 
Jeng, L. A. – Wells, P. C. [2000]: The determinants of venture capital funding: evidence 
across countries. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 6., No. 3., pp. 241–289. 
Karsai, J. [2003]: What has the state got to do with the venture capital market? Public 
financing of Venture Capital in Hungary. Acta Oeconomica, Vol. 53, No. 3., pp. 271–291. 
Karsai, J. [2010]: Private Equity in CEE. The Development of Venture Capital and Private 
Equity Industry in Central and Eastern Europe. VDM Verlag dr. Muller, Saarbrücken, 2010 
Karsai, J. [2013]: Venture Capital and Private Equity Industry in Hungary. Acta Oeconomica, 
Vol. 63, No. 1., pp. 23–42. 
King, A. [2013]: EIF terms come under fire, Unquote, November 11. 
30 
 
KPMG [2011]: EU Funds in Central and Eastern Europe. Progress Report 2007–2010. 
kpmg.hu, p. 13. 
Kramer-Eis, H. – Lang, F. [2011]: European Small Business Finance Outlook 2/2011. 
Working Paper, 2011/12, EIF Research and Market Analysis. European Investment Fund. 
Kraemer-Eis, H. – Lang, F. – Gvetadze, S. [2014]: European Small Business Finance 
Outlook. Working Paper, 2014/24, EIF Research & Market Analysis, European Investment 
Fund, June. 
Leleux, B. – Surlemont, B. [2003]: Public versus private venture capital: seeding or crowding 
out? A pan-European analysis. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 18., No. 1., January, pp. 
81–104. 
Leleux B. – Surlemont, B. – Wacquier, H. [1998]: State versus Private venture capital: cross 
Spawning or Crowding out? A Pan-European Analysis. Paper presented at the Babson 
College Kauffman Enterprepreneurship Research Centre. 
Lerner, J. [1999]: The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-run Effects of the SBIR 
Program. Journal of Business, Vol. 72., No. 3., pp. 285–318. 
Lerner, J. [2002]: When Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs: The Design of Effective 'Public 
Venture Capital' Programmes. Economic Journal, Vol. 112., No. 477., February, F73-F84. 
Lerner, J. [2009]: Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost 
Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed and What to Do About it. Princeton, 
Princeton University Press. 
Lerner, J. [2014]: Entrepreneurship, Public Policy, and Cities. Policy Research Working 
Paper, No. 6880. The World Bank, Sustainable Development Network, Urban and Disaster 
Risk Management Department, May. 
Lerner, J. – Sørensen, M. – Strömberg, P. [2011]: Private Equity and Long-Run Investment: 
The Case of Innovation. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 66., No. 2., pp. 445–477. 
Li, X. – Wu, Z. [2008]: Reputation entrenchment or risk minimization? Early Stop and 
investor-manager agency conflict in fund management. Journal of Risk Finance, Vol. 9., No. 
2., pp. 125–150. 
Manigart, S. – Bauselick, Ch. [2001]: Supply of Venture Capital By European Governments. 
Working Paper, No. 111., Ghent University. 
Martin, R. – Berndt, C. – Klagge, B. – Sunley, P. – Herten, S. – Sternberg, R. [2003]: 
Regional venture capital policy: UK and Germany compared. Report for the Anglo German 
Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society. 
31 
 
Mason, C. M. – Harrison, R. T. [2003]: Closing the Regional Equity Gap? A Critique of 
Department of Trade and Industry's Regional Venture Capital Funds Initiative. Regional 
Studies, Vol. 37., No. 8., pp. 855–868. 
Meyer, T. [2007]: The Public Sector's Role in the Promotion of Venture Capital Markets. 
SSRN, 1019988. 
Michie, R. – Wishlade, F. [2012]: Between Scylla and Charybdis: Navigating Financial 
Engineering Instruments Through Structural Funds and State Aid Requirements. European 
Policies Research Centre, IQ-Net Thematic Paper, Vol. 29., No. 2., pp. 101. 
Murray, G. C. [1998]: A Policy Response to Regional Disparities in Supply of Risk Capital to 
New Technology-based Firms in the European Union: The European Seed Capital Fund 
Scheme. Regional Studies, Vol. 32., No. 5., pp. 405–419. 
Murray, G. C. [2007]: Venture Capital and Government Policy. In: Landstrom, H. (ed.): 
Handbook of Research on Venture Capital. Cheltenham. Edward Elgar. 
Murray, G. C. – Cowling, M. – Liu, W. – Kalinowska-Beszczynska, O. [2012]: Government 
co-financed 'Hybrid' Venture Capital programmes: generalizing developed economy 
experience and its relevance to emerging nations. Kauffman International Research and 
Policy Roundtable, Liverpool, March. 
NAO [2009]: Venture capital support to small businesses. The Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 23, Session 2009–
2010, December 10. Supplementary Appendices One to Three, Appendix Two, pp. 6–13. 
NESTA [2009]: From Funding Gaps to Thin Markets: UK Government Support for Early-
Stage Venture Capital. Research Report, September. Downloaded from: 
http://www.nesta.org.uk 
Nicolaides, P. [2013]: Financial Engineering Instruments and their Assessment Under EU 
State Aid Rules. Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings, No. 26, 2013. 
Nightingale, P. – Baden-Fuller, G. – Cowling, M. – Siepel, J. – Hopkins, J. – Tidd, J. – 
Dannreuther, C. [2009]: Government Support for Enterprenurial Finance in the UK: From 
“Market Failures” to “Thin Markets”. University of Exeter, p. 29. 
OECD [2006]: The SME Financing Gap. Theory and Evidence. Vol. 1., OECD, p. 76. 
Pierrakis, Y. – Mason, C. [2008]: Shifting sands: The changing nature of the early-stage 
venture capital market in the UK. London, NESTA. 
Private Equity Findings [2010]: Great intervention? Private Equity Findings, Issue 2., Spring, 
pp. 8–10.  
32 
 
Reid, A. – Nightingale, P. (eds.) (2011): The Role of Different Funding Models in Stimulating 
the Creation of Innovative New Companies. What is the most appropriate model for Europe? 
A report to the European Research Area Board. Study funded by the European Commission, 
Directorate-General Research. 
Ryan, N. [1990]: Policy evaluation and Australian support for innovation. Technovation, Vol. 
10., No. 4., pp. 265–272. 
Tillvaxtverket [2011]: Mid-term evaluation of regional venture capital funds. Implementation 
and lessons learnt. Tillvaxtverket, September. Downloaded from: 
http://publikationer.tylllvaxtverket.se/ProductView.aspx?ID=1680. 
Tykvová, T. – Borell, M. – Kroencke, T. A. [2012]: Potential of Venture Capital in the 
European Union. Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic 
and Scientific Policy, Industry, Research and Energy, European Parliament, February. 
Veugelers, R. [2011]: Mind Europe's Early-Stage Equity Gap. Breugel Policy Contribution, 
Issue 2011/18., December. 
VICO [2011]: Venture Capital: Policy lessons from the VICO project. Downloaded from: 
http://wwww.vicoproject.org/doc/policy/VICO_FinalPolicyBrief.pdf 
Wilson, K. – Silva, F. [2013]: Policies for Seed and Early Finance. Findings from the 2012 
OECD Financing Questionnaire. OECD Science, Technology and  Industry Policy Papers, 
No. 9., OECD Publishing. Downloaded from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3xqsf00j33-en 
World Economic Forum [2010]: Globalization of Alternative Investments. Working Papers, 
Vol. 3. 'The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity'. Report 2010. Governments as 
venture capitalists: Striking the right balance. World Economic Forum, Geneva. Downloaded 
from: http://www.weforum.org/en/media/publications/PrivateEquityReports/index.htm 
 
 
